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Abstract
Reputation systems can be tricked by the spread of false rep-
utation ratings, be it false accusations or false praise. Simple
solutions such as exclusively relying on one’s own direct ob-
servations have drawbacks, as they do not make use of all the
information available. We propose a fully distributed reputa-
tion system that can cope with false disseminated information.
In our approach, everyone maintains a reputation rating and
a trust rating about everyone else that they care about. From
time to time first-hand reputation information is exchanged
with others; using a modified Bayesian approach we designed
and present in this paper, only second-hand reputation informa-
tion that is not incompatible with the current reputation rating
is accepted. Thus, reputation ratings are slightly modified by
accepted information. Trust ratings are updated based on the
compatibility of second-hand reputation information with prior
reputation ratings. Data is entirely distributed: someone’s rep-
utation and trust is the collection of ratings maintained by oth-
ers. We enable redemption and prevent the sudden exploitation
of good reputation built over time by introducing re-evaluation
and reputation fading.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Reputation systems have been proposed for a variety of appli-
cations, among them are the selection of good peers in a peer-
to-peer network, the choice of transaction partners for online
auctioning such as E-bay [20], and the detection of misbehav-
ing nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks [3]. There is a trade-off
between efficiency in using the available information and ro-
bustness against false ratings [4]. If the ratings made by others
are considered, the reputation system can be vulnerable to false
accusations or false praise. However, if only one’s own expe-
rience is considered, the potential of learning from experience
made by others goes unused. Using only positive or only neg-
ative information reduces the vulnerability to only false praise

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or only false accusations.
Our goal is to make existing systems both robust against false
ratings and efficient at detecting misbehavior. We propose a
mechanism that makes use of all the available information, i.e.
both positive and negative, both from own and from others’
experience. To make the reputation system robust we include a
way of dealing with false ratings.
In the remainder of this paper we refer to the entities in the
reputation system as nodes, since we apply the reputation sys-
tem to peer-to-peer and mobile ad-hoc networks.
1.2 Solution Overview
The main properties of a reputation system are the representa-
tion of reputation, how the reputation is built and updated, and
for the latter, how the ratings of others are considered and in-
tegrated. The reputation of a given node is the collection of
ratings maintained by others about this node. In our approach,
a node  maintains two ratings about every other node  that
is cares about. The reputation rating represents the opinion
formed by node  about node  ’s behavior as an actor in the
base system (for example, whether node  correctly participates
in the routing protocol of a mobile ad-hoc network, or whether
it provides correct files in a peer-to-peer file-sharing system).
The trust rating represents node  ’s opinion about how honest
node  is as an actor in the reputation system (i.e. whether the
reported first hand information summaries published by node 
are likely to be true). We represent the ratings that node  has
about node  as data structures 
	  for reputation and 	  for
trust. In addition, node  maintains a summary record of first
hand information about node  in a data structure called 	  .
To take advantage of disseminated reputation information,
i.e., to learn from observations made by others before having
to learn by own experience, we need a means of incorporating
the reputation ratings into the views of others. We do this as
follows. First, whenever node  makes a first hand observa-
tion of node  ’s behavior, the first hand information 	  and
the reputation rating 	  are updated. Second, from time to
time, nodes publish their first-hand information to a subset of
the population. Say that node  receives from  some first hand
information 	  about node  . If  is classified as “trustwor-
thy” by  , or if 	  is close to 
	  (in a sense that is made
precise in Section 3.3) then  	  is accepted by  and is used
to slightly modify the rating  	  . Else, the reputation rating
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is not updated. In all cases, the trust rating  
	  is updated;
if 	  is close to 	  , the trust rating  	  slightly improves,
else it slightly worsens. The updates are based on a modified
Bayesian approach we designed and present in this paper, and
on a linear model merging heuristic.
Note that, with our method, only first hand information  
	 
is published; the reputation and trust ratings  
	  and  	  are
never disseminated.
The ratings are used to make decisions about other nodes,
which is the ultimate goal of the entire reputation system.
For example, in a mobile ad-hoc network, decisions are about
whether to forward for another node, which path to choose,
whether to avoid another node and delete it from the path cache,
and whether to warn others about another node. In our frame-
work, this is done as follows. Every node uses its rating to
periodically classify other nodes, according to two criteria: (1)
normal/misbehaving (2) trustworthy/untrustworthy. Both clas-
sifications are performed using the Bayesian approach, based
on reputation ratings for the former, trust ratings for the latter.
2 Related Work
False accusations are not an issue in positive reputation sys-
tems, since no negative information is kept [16, 7], however,
the disseminated information could still be false praise and re-
sult in a good reputation for misbehaving nodes. Moreover,
even if the disseminated information is correct, one cannot dis-
tinguish between a misbehaving node and a new node that just
joined. Many reputation systems build on positive reputation
only [21], some couple privileges to accumulated good repu-
tation, e.g. for exchange of gaming items or auctioning [20].
Josang and Ismail [13] also use a Bayesian approach, it is,
however, centralized and discounts the belief in second-hand
information according to the reputation of agents, equating the
trustworthiness of an agent as a witness with its performance
in the base system. Lying nodes that aim at changing the repu-
tation of another node, however, can still perform normally in
the base system. We therefore separate the performance in the
base system (reputation) from the one in the reputation system
itself (trust). Mui et al. [17] present a computational model
for reputation which is also based on Bayesian estimation, but
uses chains of reputations ratings to obtain indirect measures
of reputation, assuming trust transitivity. Another centralized
reputation system exploiting reputation paths between entities
has been proposed by Zacharia et al. [22].
A reputation-based trust management has been introduced
by Aberer and Despotovic in the context of peer-to-peer sys-
tems [1], using the data provided by a decentralized storage
method (P-Grid) as a basis for a data-mining analysis to assess
the probability that an agent will cheat in the future given the
information of past transactions. The disseminated information
is exclusively negative, in the form of complaints that are then
redundantly stored at different agents. When agents want to
assess the trustworthiness of other agents, they query several
agents for complaints about the agent in question. To assess
the trustworthiness of the agents responding to the query , a
complaint query about the complaining agent can be made, and
so on.
A formal model for trust in dynamic networks based on in-
tervals and a policy language has been proposed by Carbone et
al. [5]. They express both trust and the uncertainty of it as trust
ordering and information ordering, respectively. They consider
the delegation of trust to other principals. In their model, only
positive information influences trust, such that the information
ordering and the trust ordering can differ. In our system, both
positive and negative information influence trust and certainty,
since we prefer  positive observations that come out of  total
observations to  out of  when  .
Collaboration enforcement for peer-to-peer networks have
been proposed by Moreton and Twigg [19]. They allow for
selective trust transitivity and distinguish between trust as par-
ticipator and trust as recommender. They define three opera-
tors, namely discounting, consensus, and difference, to com-
pute trust values. Since they use recommenders, trust in par-
ticipators, trust in recommenders, and meta-recommenders, the
trust becomes recursive and they thus look for fixed-point solu-
tions to the resulting trust equations.
Given that there is no incentive for truthful reputation re-
porting because reporting provides a competitive advantage to
others, reporting positive ratings lead to a relative degradation
of the reputation of the reporter, and by reporting fake nega-
tive ratings it is improved. Jurca and Faltings [14] aim for an
incentive-compatible mechanism by introducing payment for
reputation. The agents pay to receive reputation ratings from
so-called R-agents, which in turn pay agents providing the in-
formation. Agents only get payed for their reputation report if
the next agent report has the same result. This approach is inter-
esting in that contains a heuristic to address dishonest ratings,
which however does not take into account collusion, where
nodes could have influence on the next report. To encourage
the exchange of reputation information, Pinocchio [10] rewards
participants that advertise their experience to others and uses a
probabilistic honesty metric to detect dishonest users and de-
prive them of the rewards. The reward can be used to query
the reputation of others. Pinocchio does not intend to protect
against conspiracies or bad-mouthing.
The EigenTrust mechanism [15] aggregates trust informa-
tion from peer by having them perform a distributed trust cal-
culation approaching the Eigenvalue of the trust matrix over
the peers. The algorithm relies on the presence of pre-trusted
peers, that is some peers have to be trusted, regardless their
performance, prior to having interacted with them. The system
relieves peer with bad performance from delivering files, due
to their bad reputation. By isolating peers with bad reputation,
the number of inauthentic downloads is decreased, however, if
the motivation for misbehavior is selfishness, the misbehaved
peers are rewarded.
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3 Solution Proposal: A Bayesian Ap-
proach to Reputation Systems
3.1 A Bayesian Framework
Node  models the behavior of node  as an actor in the base
system as follows. Node  thinks that there is a parameter  
such that node  misbehaves with probability   , and that the
outcome is drawn independently from observation to observa-
tion (Node  thinks that there is a different parameter   for ev-
ery different node  , and every node  may believe in differ-
ent parameters   ; thus   should be indexed by  and  , but for
brevity, we omit the indices here). The parameters   are un-
known, and node  models this uncertainty by assuming that
  itself is drawn according to a distribution (the “prior”) that is
updated as new observations become available. This is the stan-
dard Bayesian framework. We use for the prior the distribution
Beta 	 , as is commonly done [2, 6], since it is suitable for
Bernoulli distributions and the conjugate is also a Beta distri-
bution.
The standard Bayesian procedure is as follows. Initially, the
prior is Beta 

 , the uniform distribution on  
 ; this rep-
resents absence of information about which   will be drawn.
Then, when a new observation is made, say with  observed
misbehaviors and  observed correct behaviors, the prior is up-
dated according to ﬀﬁ and ﬂﬃ ﬁ . If   , the
true unknown value, is constant, then after a large number 
of observations, ﬁ! "  (in expectation), #! $%
'&( ) and
Beta 	 becomes close to a Dirac at   , as expected. The
advantage of using the Beta function is that it only needs two
parameters that are continuously updated as observations are
made or reported. See Figure 1 (the actual calculation of the
density has been carried out here for illustrative purpose only).
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Figure 1: Density of the Beta Function.
We use a modification of the standard Bayesian method, one
for reputation, and one for trust, as described next.
3.2 Modified Bayesian Approach for First-
Hand Information
The first-hand information record  	  mentioned in the intro-
duction has the form * . It represents the parameters of the
Beta distribution assumed by node  in its Bayesian view of
node  ’s behavior as an actor in the base system. Initially, it is
set to 

 .
The standard Bayesian method gives the same weight to each
observation, regardless of its time of occurrence. We want to
give less weight to evidence received in the past to allow for
reputation fading. We therefore developed a modified Bayesian
update approach by introducing a moving weighted average as
follows. Assume  makes one individual observation about  ;
let (+
 if this observation is qualified as misbehavior (by
a system such as CONFIDANT), and ,- otherwise. The
update is
 ﬃ ./01 (1)
 ﬃ .234
5&67 (2)
The weight . is a discount factor for past experiences, which
serves as the fading mechanism.
We now analyze how to find a good value of . . Call 987;:<:<:=>?
the sequence of observations. We can easily derive from Equa-
tion (1) that the value of  after  first hand observations is
	?@A?' ."?CB"8$4:<:=:ﬀ.
?CB"8
78D .
? (3)
Assume (temporarily) that   would be constant. For large  we
would have
E
F
?
$G
 

5&,.
(4)
E

?
$G

5&, 

5&,.
(5)
Assume in addition that HI 8
8JB2K
is an integer. Thus the stan-
dard Bayesian approach after H observations would result in
the same posterior as ours after infinitely many observations.
Thus, as a rule of thumb, we should select . as
.0L
5&


H
(6)
where H is the order of magnitude of the number of observa-
tions over which we believe it makes sense to assume stationary
behavior.
In addition, during inactivity periods, we periodically decay
the values of  as follows. Whenever the inactivity time
expires, we let ﬂM./ and N-.2 . This is to allow for
redemption even in the absence of observations, either due re-
taliatory exclusion or simply lack of interaction.
3.3 Reputation Rating and Model Merging
The reputation rating 
	  is also defined by two numbers, say
	OFPOQ . Initially, it is set to %
9;
7 . It is updated on two types of
events: (1) when first-hand observation is updated (2) when a
reputation rating published by some other node is accepted and
copied.
In the former case, the update is the same as for the first-hand
information. More precisely: let SR,T
VU be the observation:

O
ﬃ ./
O
( (7)

O
ﬃ .2
O
A%
W& 7 (8)
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If the update to the first-hand information is due to inactivity,
the formula is  O ﬃ ./ O ,  O ﬃ .2 O .
In the latter case, we use linear pool model merging [2], as
follows. Assume node  receives the reported first-hand infor-
mation  	  from node  . The question is how to detect and
avoid false reports. Our approach is for a node  to take into
account trust and compatibility. If 	  is such that  considers
 trustworthy according to Equation (14) (defined later),  	 
is considered by node  who modifies  
	  according to

	 ' 
	  

  	  (9)
Here,  is a small positive constant [2]. This is performed for
all  contained in the report.
Otherwise,  considers  untrustworthy, and, for every node
 in the report, uses the results of the deviation test, as follows.
We denote with
E
 Beta 	 the expectation of the distribu-
tion Beta * . Let   	   5$ and  
	  ﬂ D * The
deviation test is

E
 Beta 5  $  &
E
 Beta 	

	 (10)
where
	
is a positive constant (deviation threshold). If the de-
viation test is positive, the first hand information  	  is con-
sidered incompatible and is not used. Else  	  is incorporated
using Equation (9) as previously.
3.4 Trust Ratings
Trust rating uses a similar Bayesian approach. Node  thinks
that there is a parameter  such that node  gives false reports
with probability  , so it uses for  the prior Beta  V . The
trust rating  	  is equal to  V .
Initially, 	V$L

 . Then an update is performed when-
ever node  receives a reported by some node  on first-hand
information about node  . Let 6
 if the deviation test in
Equation (10) succeeds, and  ﬁ otherwise. The trust rating


	 
L	V is updated by
   ( (11)
  5A%
5& 7 (12)
Here  is the discount factor for trust, similar to . . There is a
similar update in periods of inactivity as for first hand informa-
tion.
Note that the deviation test is always performed, whether 
is considered trustworthy by  or not. In the former case, it is
used only to update 	  ; in the latter case, it is used to update


	  and decide whether to update  
	  .
3.5 Classification
The decision-making process works as follows. First, the pos-
terior according to all the given data is calculated. This is done
by node  by updating 	 '  O  O  and  	    V as ex-
plained above. Then node  chooses the decision with minimal
loss.
We use squared-error loss for the deviation from the true  
and  ; this amounts to considering E  Beta   O  O   for   and
E
 Beta  V for  . More precisely:
Node  classifies the behavior of node  as

normal if
E
 Beta   O  O  
misbehaving if
E
 Beta  O  O 


(13)
and the trustworthiness of node  as

trustworthy if
E
 Beta  V 
untrustworthy if
E
 Beta 	V


(14)
The thresholds  and  are an expression of tolerance. If node
 tolerates a node  that misbehaves not more than half of the
time, it should set  to 0.5. In analogy, if  trusts a node if its
ratings deviate no more than in 25% of the cases, it sets its 
to 0.75. In the case of an asymmetric loss function for false
positives and negatives, the classification has to be modified.
3.6 Issues in Distributed Reputation Systems
Should liars be punished? If we punish nodes for their seem-
ingly inaccurate testimonials, we might end up punishing the
messenger and thus discourage honest reporting of observed
misbehavior. Note that we evaluate testimonial accuracy ac-
cording to affinity to the belief of the requesting node along
with the overall belief of the network as gathered over time.
The accuracy is not measured as compared to the actual true
behavior of a node, since the latter is unknown and can not
be proved beyond doubt. Even if it were possible to test a
node and obtain a truthful verdict on its nature, a contradict-
ing previous testimonial could still be accurate. Thus, instead
of punishing deviating views we restrict our system to merely
reduce their impact on public opinion. Some node is bound to
be the first witness of a node misbehaving, thus starting to de-
viate from public opinion. Punishing this discovery would be
counterproductive, as the goal is precisely to learn about misbe-
having nodes even before having had to make a bad experience
in direct encounter. Therefore, in our design, we do not punish
a node when it is classified as untrustworthy.
Identity. The question of identity is central to reputation sys-
tems. We require three properties of identity which we call per-
sistent, unique, and distinct. We are investigating the use of ex-
pensive pseudonyms [11], cryptographically generated unique
identifiers [18], and secure hardware modules [12] to counter
identity problems such as the Sybil attack [9].
Redemption. Our solution enforces redemption of nodes
over time, by the combination of two mechanisms: periodic
re-evaluation and reputation fading. Periodic re-evaluation is
implemented by the fact that node classification is performed
periodically. It is thus possible for a node to redeem itself,
given that nodes have each their own reputation belief which
is not necessarily shared by all the others. Since their opinions
can differ, a node is most probably not excluded by all other
nodes and can thus partially participate in the network with the
potential of showing its good behavior. Even if this is not the
case and the suspect is excluded by everyone it can redeem
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itself by means of the second mechanism. Reputation fading
is implemented by our modification to the Bayesian update of
the posterior, which decays exponentially. Contrary to standard
Bayesian estimation, this gives more weight to recent observa-
tions. We also periodically discount the rating in the absence
of testimonials and observations.
4 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our reputation system as ap-
plied to CONFIDANT [3], a misbehavior detection system for
mobile ad-hoc networks, using the GloMoSim [23] simulator.
We are interested in its performance according to the following
metrics.
1. Detection time of misbehaving nodes. We measure this as
the simulation time taken for all misbehaving nodes to be
classified as detected by all normal nodes. Figure 2 shows
the mean for a network of 50 nodes. To show the effect of
presence or absence of the reputation system model merg-
ing, we set  , the weight for second-hand observations, to
0.1 and 0, the latter meaning that nodes do not consider
second-hand information at all. This enables us to com-
pare the use of second-hand reports to relying exclusively
on first-hand observation.
2. Robustness. First, against false accusations (false pos-
itives). We consider a false positive to be the classifi-
cation of a normal node as misbehaving by one normal
node. Figure 3 shows them. Second, robustness against
false praise (false negatives), i.e. a misbehaving node has
been classified as normal despite the information avail-
able, hence there was a misclassification in the steady state
of the protocol.
3. Overhead in terms of control messages, computation, and
storage: The overhead directly caused by our reputation
system applied to CONFIDANT is measured by the num-
ber of first-hand publications per node broadcast with a
TTL of 1. It depends only on the chosen timer between
publications, in this scenario the timer is set to 10s. These
publications do not get forwarded. Storage overhead are
the three ratings,  
	  ,  
	  , and  	  , that each node 
stores about each node  that it cares about. The ratings
consist of two parameters each.
4.1 Liar strategies
Untrustworthy nodes can have different strategies to publish
their falsified first-hand information in an attempt to influence
reputation ratings, e.g. when they want to discredit normal
nodes or raise the reputation of misbehaving nodes. The basic
strategies consist of changing the parameter  , denoting mis-
behavior instances, or  , denoting normal behavior, or both.
These can then also be mixed or applied only occasionally. If
for example both parameters are changed by swapping them,
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they will not pass the deviation test explained in Equation
10. Consider the strategy to worsen the published information
about a node, the case of artificially improving it is analogous.
If the worsening is considerable, it will not pass the deviation
test. A more sophisticated alternative is a stealthy approach
where the published information about another node is only
worsened a little. Although nodes do not know the content of
the reputation ratings held by others, they could try to make
an inference from the first-hand information nodes publish to
make an estimation. They could then try to lie only so much
as to just pass the deviation test. Even when this is successful,
the impact is very small as it, having passed the deviation test,
only differs slightly from the reputation rating a node already
has. The impact is further reduced by fading and by the limited
frequency by which nodes consider second-hand information
by another node.
4.2 Intoxication
If nodes use the trust option to allow incompatible second-hand
information to be used in order to speed up detection, nodes
could try to gain trust from others by telling the truth over a
sustained period of time and only then start lying. To exacer-
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bate that problem, nodes could also just reflect the second-hand
information they receive from others and publish it as their first-
hand information without having to have actual first-hand in-
formation themselves. We call this intoxication. This effect
is mitigated by two properties of our approach. First, fading
discounts trust gained in the past and recent deviations reduce
trust more strongly. Second, in telling the truth or publishing
whichever information passes the deviation test, they actually
reinforce the reputation ratings other nodes have, making it
harder to have their then deviating information be accepted.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a robust reputation system for mis-
behavior detection in mobile ad-hoc networks. Our solution
is based on a modified Bayesian estimation approach which
we designed. In our approach, everyone maintains a reputa-
tion rating and a trust rating about everyone else who is of in-
terest. The approach is fully distributed and no agreement is
necessary. However, to speed up the detection of misbehav-
ing nodes, it is advantageous to, cautiously, make use also of
reputation records from others in addition to first-hand obser-
vations. These records are only considered in the case when
they come from a source that has consistently been trustworthy
or when they pass the deviation test which evaluates compati-
bility with one’s own reputation ratings. Even after passing the
test, they only slightly modify the reputation rating of a node.
The results of the deviation test are additionally used to update
the trust rating. We allow for redemption and prevent capital-
izing excessively on past behavior by two mechanisms, namely
re-evaluation and fading. It has been argued that traditional
statistical approaches so far do not assume malicious behavior
[8]. Our reputation system uses Bayesian estimation to specif-
ically address lying nodes. We showed that our method is cop-
ing well with false second-hand reports, as it keeps the number
of false positives and false negatives low. Our simulation also
showed that the detection of misbehaving nodes accelerates sig-
nificantly with the use of selected second-hand information. As
a next step, we will be evaluating our reputation system as ap-
plied to a peer-to-peer network.
References
[1] Karl Aberer and Zoran Despotovic. Managing trust in a peer-2-peer in-
formation system. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference
on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM 2001), 2001.
[2] James O. Berger. Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis.
Springer, second edition edition, 1985.
[3] Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. Performance Analysis of the
CONFIDANT Protocol: Cooperation Of Nodes — Fairness In Dynamic
Ad-hoc NeTworks. In Proceedings of IEEE/ACM Symposium on Mobile
Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHOC), Lausanne, CH, June
2002. IEEE.
[4] Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. The effect of rumor spread-
ing in reputation systems in mobile ad-hoc networks. Wiopt’03, Sofia-
Antipolis, March 2003.
[5] Marco Carbone, Mogens Nielsen, and Vladimiro Sassone. A formal
model for trust in dynamic networks. BRICS Report RS-03-4, 2003.
[6] Anthony Davison. Statistical Models. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge Series in Statistical and Probabilistic Mathematics, ISBN:
0521773393, October 2003.
[7] Chrysanthos Dellarocas. Immunizing online reputation reporting systems
against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior. In Proceedings of the
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 150–157, 2000.
[8] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson. Reputation in
p2p anonymity systems. Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Sys-
tems, Berkeley, CA, June 2003.
[9] John R. Douceur. The sybil attack. In Proc. of the IPTPS02 Workshop,
Cambridge, MA (USA), March 2002.
[10] Alberto Fernandes, Evangelos Kotsovinos, Sven string, and Boris
Dragovic. Incentives for honest participation in distributed trust man-
agement. In Proceedings of iTrust 2004, Oxford, UK, March 2004.
[11] Eric Friedman and Paul Resnick. The social cost of cheap pseudonyms.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 10(2):173–199, 2001.
[12] Trusted Computing Group. Tcg main specification version 1.1b.
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/, November 2003.
[13] Audun Josang and Roslan Ismail. The beta reputation system. In Pro-
ceedings of the 15th Bled Electronic Commerce Conference, Bled, Slove-
nia, June 2002.
[14] R. Jurca and B. Faltings. An incentive compatible reputation mechanism.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on E-Commerce, Newport Beach,
CA, USA, June 24-27, 2003.
[15] Sepandar D. Kamvar, Mario T. Schlosser, and Hector Garcia-Molina. The
eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in p2p networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the Twelfth International World Wide Web Conference, May,
2003, 2003.
[16] Peter Kollock. The production of trust in online markets. Advances in
Group Processes, edited by E. J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne, and H. A.
Walker, 16, 1999.
[17] A. Halberstadt L. Mui, M. Mohtashemi. A computational model of trust
and reputation. In Proceedings of the 35th Hawaii International Confer-
ence on System Science (HICSS), January 7-10, 2002.
[18] G. Montenegro and C. Castelluccia. Statistically unique and crypto-
graphically verifiable(sucv) identifiers and addresses. NDSS’02, Febru-
ary 2002., 2002.
[19] Tim Moreton and Andrew Twigg. Enforcing collaboration in peer-to-peer
routing services. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on
Trust Management, Heraklion, Crete, May 2003.
[20] Paul Resnick and Richard Zeckhauser. Trust among strangers in internet
transactions: Empirical analysis of ebay’s reputation system. Working
Paper for the NBER workshop on empirical studies of electronic com-
merce, 2001.
[21] Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman, and Ko Kuwabara.
Reputation systems. Communications of the ACM, 43(12):45–48, 2000.
[22] G. Zacharia, A. Moukas, and P. Maes. Collaborative reputation mech-
anisms in electronic marketplaces. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual
Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences. HICSS-32., 1999.
[23] Xiang Zeng, Rajive Bagrodia, and Mario Gerla. GloMoSim: A library
for parallel simulation of large-scale wireless networks. Proceedings of
the 12th Workshop on Parallel and Distributed Simulations–PADS ’98,
May 26-29, in Banff, Alberta, Canada, 1998.
6
